

TOKENXGAMES INTERACTIVE

TXX

**The settlement layer for skill-based
competitive gaming on BNB Smart
Chain.**

TXX · BEP-20 · CHAIN ID 56 · FIXED SUPPLY 100,000,000

100M

TOTAL SUPPLY

8.4-11.9M

FLOAT AT TGE

BNB Chain

MAINNET · ID 56

12 months

TEAM CLIFF

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1	Executive summary	10	Buyback and burn
2	Background and vision	11	Technology and security
3	Market	12	Game integrity
4	The platform today	13	Governance
5	The three-currency model	14	Roadmap
6	TXX-first settlement	15	Transparency and reporting
7	Token utility	16	Risk factors
8	Token specification	17	Legal and compliance
9	Token economics	18	Glossary

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All figures describing future emission, burn, supply, or platform activity are projections derived from the token's programmed schedule and from stated assumptions. Assumptions may prove wrong. Forward-looking statements are not guarantees, and actual outcomes may differ materially. Product features described as planned may be delayed, changed, or never delivered.

Parameters marked as pending a decision are not final and may change before deployment. Nothing in this document supersedes the smart contracts as deployed and verified on-chain; where this document and deployed bytecode disagree, the bytecode governs. Digital assets carry substantial risk including total loss of value. Conduct independent due diligence and take professional advice before participating.

SECTION 1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

TokenXGames is a live skill-gaming platform distributed through Telegram and the web. TXX is the token that settles what happens on it. The distinction that matters most in this document is that the platform came first: the games, the wallet, the payment rails, the

tournament engine, and the ledger are running software with real players and real money moving through them. TXX is being introduced underneath an economy that already exists, not proposed as the reason to build one.

1.1 What TokenXGames is

TokenXGames operates real-money, skill-based competitive games — dice-and-race boards, grid strategy, timed arcade duels — playable head-to-head or in bracketed tournaments. Players fund an account by card, Apple Pay, Google Pay, Telegram Stars, TON, USDT, ETH, or BTC. They compete, and they withdraw. The platform takes a percentage of each contested pot.

This is deliberately not a play-to-earn design. There is no yield-bearing NFT, no breeding economy, no emission stream paid to players for showing up. Players compete against each other for a pot they funded; the platform charges for hosting the contest. That model predates cryptocurrency by a century, and its economics do not depend on new entrants buying a token from earlier entrants.

1.2 What TXX is and what it does

TXX is a settlement and discount instrument, not a payment method players are required to hold.

Whatever a player funds with, the platform settles the match in TXX underneath, takes its rake in TXX, and burns a fixed share of that rake. A player paying £10 by Apple Pay sees a £10 balance and plays. They never need a wallet, a seed phrase, or gas.

TXX does four things:

- **It settles matches.** Every contested pot resolves in TXX at the protocol layer, regardless of how the player funded it.
- **It discounts fees.** Funding in TXX carries the lowest rake. Staking TXX discounts it further. Withdrawing in TXX is the cheapest and fastest exit.
- **It converts revenue into supply reduction.** A fixed share of rake is used to buy TXX on the open market and burn it.
- **It funds the ecosystem.** Tournament prize pools, player rewards, and grants to outside studios are denominated and paid in TXX.

THE DESIGN CONSTRAINT THAT SHAPES EVERYTHING

Fee discounts are consumption benefits — a cheaper price on a service the holder actually uses. Distributions of platform revenue to passive holders are not. TXX deliberately carries **no revenue share, no profit participation, and no dividend**, at any staking tier. That is a design decision taken to keep TXX a utility instrument rather than an investment contract, and it will not be reversed without a written legal opinion.

1.3 Supply at a glance

100,000,000 TXX are minted once, in the constructor, and distributed atomically to ten separate contract addresses. There is no mint function in the deployed bytecode. There is no transfer tax, no blacklist, no pause, and no upgradeable proxy on the token. Supply can only ever fall, through burning.

TEAM & ADVISORS	PRIVATE / SEED	PUBLIC SALE	BURN SOURCE
15% 12-month cliff, 60-month vest	3% Deliberately small	10% \$0.04 against \$0.05 launch	Rake only Never deposit principal

1.4 What is already built

The following are running in production today, not planned:

- Multiple self-contained real-money game engines, each with its own controllers, services, socket namespace, and matchmaking, sharing one wallet and one ledger.
- Three independent payment rails — card (via Ziina), TON on-chain, and Telegram Stars — unified behind a single balance, with every rail independently re-verified server-side before crediting.
- A tournament engine with clock-driven autostart, bracket progression, configurable prize splits and an explicit house margin.
- A transaction ledger recording, per event, the balance before and after across every currency, the game and match, and whether the opponent was a human or a bot.
- A withdrawal pipeline with platform and network fee separation, admin review, and deterministic reconciliation of ambiguous on-chain sends.
- A referral system paying both a signup bonus and a commission on referred-player withdrawals.

1.5 What is not yet true

Four things are stated plainly here because they are material and because a reader will otherwise assume them.

- **Provable fairness is a pre-launch deliverable, not a current property.** Game outcomes today are decided server-side and are not independently verifiable by a player. Section 12 describes what exists now and what must ship before TGE. No claim of provable fairness is made anywhere in this document about the platform as it stands.
- **The token does not exist yet.** No TXX has been deployed to any mainnet. No distribution of any kind has occurred.
- **The economics depend on scale the platform has not yet reached.** The burn engine is funded by rake, and rake is a function of contested volume. Section 10 states the volume at which burn offsets emission, and does not pretend that level is reached at launch.

- **The games themselves do not run on a blockchain, and are not intended to.** Today a chain is load-bearing at exactly two points: money entering the platform, and money leaving it. Deposits are verified by reading the chain for a matching transfer, and withdrawals are signed and broadcast from a platform-controlled wallet. Everything between those two points — matchmaking, physics, scoring, rake, tournament brackets, the internal Coin balance — executes on TokenXGames's servers and settles in its database. A won match moves a number in a database row; it does not emit a transaction. This is a deliberate design choice rather than an unfinished migration: a 30-per-second physics loop cannot run on-chain at a cost or latency any player would accept, and pretending otherwise would be the kind of claim this section exists to avoid. It also means the honesty in the first bullet above matters more, not less — where outcomes are decided off-chain, verifiability has to be engineered deliberately rather than inherited from the chain.

One further distinction follows from that, and is easy to misread. The chain integration live in production today is **TON**, used for deposits and withdrawals. TXX is a **BNB Smart Chain** token that does not exist yet. These are two separate systems, and the existence of working TON payment rails should not be read as evidence that TXX infrastructure is already built. Section 12 sets out what exists now and what must ship before TGE.

1.6 Associated challenges and risks

The principal risks to TXX are, in the order the team weights them: the gap between launch-scale rake and the scheduled emission curve (Section 10.4); dependency on a single distribution channel; the regulatory posture of real-money gaming across jurisdictions; the integrity of game outcomes and the trust cost of getting it wrong (Section 12); and the possibility of executing well into a hostile market for gaming tokens. Section 16 sets these out in full.

SECTION 2

BACKGROUND AND VISION

2.1 Where this starts

Most gaming tokens are issued to finance a game that does not exist. The whitepaper describes the world, the token funds the build, and the economics are modelled against a user base that is entirely hypothetical. The failure mode is well documented: emission begins on schedule, the product arrives late or not at all, and the only demand ever present was speculative.

TokenXGames inverts that sequence. The platform is live and taking payments across multiple rails. The economic loop — deposit, compete, rake, withdraw — is running. What is missing is a settlement asset that converts that loop into something with a supply schedule and a burn mechanism attached.

2.2 The distribution thesis

The platform is built as a Telegram Mini App with a parallel web surface. That choice is the core distribution bet, and it cuts both ways.

In its favour: Telegram removes the two hardest steps in mobile gaming acquisition. There is no app store review, no install, and no separate account creation — a player arrives from a chat message and is in a match in seconds. Telegram Stars gives an in-platform payment rail that works for users who have never touched crypto, and TON Connect gives a wallet path for users who have.

Against it: a platform whose distribution rests entirely on one company's policy is one policy change away from losing it. The mitigation is structural rather than clever — the web surface is built and maintained in parallel precisely so that Telegram is a channel rather than the business, and a standalone application is on the roadmap for the same reason.

2.3 Vision

The objective is to become the settlement and payments infrastructure for skill-based competitive gaming, rather than a company that owns a handful of games.

Today TokenXGames builds its own titles, which makes it a game studio with a payment stack attached. The intended end state is the reverse: outside studios build competitive titles, and TokenXGames supplies wallet, identity, matchmaking, tournament infrastructure, multi-currency payments, fraud controls, and settlement. The Ecosystem & Developer Grants bucket exists to buy that transition — a studio with a strong game and no payments capability is offered funding and instant distribution in exchange for launching on the platform, and is paid in TXX, which aligns them with the network rather than making them a vendor.

The distinction matters commercially. Game studios are valued on the hits they own. Infrastructure is valued on the volume that settles across it.




Figure 2.1 — The intended transition. The Ecosystem & Developer Grants bucket (15% of supply) exists to fund the move from the left-hand model to the right-hand one.

MARKET

3.1 Skill gaming, not chance

Real-money skill gaming — where the outcome is materially determined by player ability rather than chance — occupies a different regulatory and cultural position from casino-style gambling in most jurisdictions, and a different competitive position from free-to-play mobile gaming. The genres TokenXGames operates in are the ones that translate: race-and-capture board games, grid strategy, and timed reaction duels, all of which are decided over repeated play by skill, and all of which are already played socially at enormous scale in South Asia, the Middle East, and South East Asia.

3.2 Why messaging-native distribution matters

Casual mobile gaming's economics are dominated by user acquisition cost. Studios pay to install, then monetise a small fraction of installs through advertising and in-app purchase. The channel is expensive, and it is intermediated by two app stores that take a platform fee.

Messaging-native distribution changes both variables. There is no install step, so the cost of the funnel collapses toward the cost of the message. And the social graph is the acquisition mechanism — a player challenges a friend inside the conversation where the friendship already lives. The referral system is built directly onto that behaviour rather than bolted on.

3.3 An honest read of the token cycle

Gaming tokens are, at the time of writing, in a weak part of their cycle. A great many were issued against products that never shipped, and the market has priced that experience in. A new gaming token launching into this environment should expect scepticism as the default position, and should expect to be assessed on evidence rather than narrative.

The response to that is not to argue the sentiment is wrong. It is to be the kind of project that survives it: a live product with real revenue before the token exists, a deliberately small cheap-token allocation, a long team lock, published burn figures including the months the target is missed, and no revenue-share mechanic that would make TXX a security in the jurisdictions that matter. Section 10.4 states the volume required for burn to offset emission and does not claim launch-scale volume reaches it.

3.4 Positioning

MODEL	WHERE DEMAND COMES FROM	STRUCTURAL WEAKNESS
Play-to-earn	New entrants buying in so earlier entrants can be paid	Requires perpetual user growth; collapses when growth stops
NFT-asset games	Speculation on tradable in-game assets	Asset value depends on continued speculation, not gameplay
Free-to-play	Advertising and in-app purchase from a small paying minority	No token role; dominated by user acquisition economics
TXX — skill settlement	A fee on contested volume between players	Requires real contested volume; no volume, no rake, no burn

The weakness in the last row is real and is stated deliberately. TXX has no mechanism that manufactures demand in the absence of people playing for money. That is a constraint, and it is also the point: the token's value driver is the same thing as the business's value driver, which is not true of the three rows above it.

SECTION 4

THE PLATFORM TODAY

This section describes software that exists. It is included because the most common failure in token documentation is describing a system in the future tense that has never been built, and the most useful thing a reader can be given is the ability to distinguish what is running from what is planned. Everything in Section 4 is running. Items marked otherwise are marked explicitly.

4.1 System architecture

The platform is three deployed subsystems over one database and one ledger.




Figure 4.1 — Platform architecture. Solid borders are deployed; dashed is planned. The TXX contract layer attaches beneath the wallet and payments modules without changing the client contract — this is what makes settlement invisible to the player.

4.2 Game engine architecture

Each title is a self-contained engine rather than a mode inside a monolith. An engine owns its controllers, services, repositories, models, socket namespace, bot logic, and validators, and exposes a uniform interface to the rest of the platform: a player-facing router, an admin router, and a socket registration hook.

This is the single most important structural decision in the codebase for the token's purpose, because it is what makes the platform extensible to third-party titles. A new game does not require changes to the wallet, the ledger, the tournament engine, or the payment rails. It implements the interface and inherits all of them.




Figure 4.2 — Engine anatomy. The uniform three-interface contract is what turns the platform from a game studio into infrastructure a grant recipient can build against.

4.3 Game portfolio

The live portfolio covers three competitive genres, each chosen because it is culturally established, quick to resolve, and decided by skill over repeated play.

GENRE	COMPETITIVE SHAPE	MODES IN PRODUCTION
Race-and-capture board	Turn-based dice movement with capture and blocking decisions; multiple board geometries including a four-seat square board and a six-seat variant	Online matchmaking, private rooms, friend challenges, practice, tournament
Grid strategy	Placement and line-formation on a configurable grid; move-by-move server-recorded	Online matchmaking, friend rooms, practice, tournament
Timed duel / arcade	Reaction and scoring under a clock, head-to-head or against a session target	Online matchmaking, private rooms, session play, leaderboard, tournament

Additional titles appear in the client catalogue ahead of their engines and are in development. The platform's roadmap targets a materially wider portfolio, with the majority of new titles expected to come from grant-funded third-party studios rather than in-house development — that transition is the purpose of the Ecosystem bucket described in Section 9.

4.4 Payment rails

Three independent rails are live, and all three converge on one balance. The player picks a funding method; everything downstream is identical.




Figure 4.3 — Payment rail convergence. The governing rule across all rails: client and webhook signals are treated as hints, and the server independently re-verifies against the provider or the chain before crediting anything.

4.5 The ledger

Every balance-affecting event writes an immutable ledger record. The record carries more than an amount: it captures the balance before and after across each currency the event touched, the game and match it belongs to, the flow it occurred in — ranked match, private room, tournament, practice — and, critically, whether the opponent was a human or a bot.

Why the bot flag matters

The ledger schema models opponent type and a full bot descriptor uniformly across every match record, and the majority of live engines already populate it on settlement. That means the disclosure obligation described in Section 12 — telling a player whether they are facing a person or software — is largely implementable from data the system already captures. The remaining work is completing population in the engines that do not yet write it, and building the player-facing surface. The hard part is normally the data model, and the data model is there.

The ledger is the substrate the token economy is built on. Rake attribution, burn accounting, reserve-ratio calculation, and the public burn dashboard all read from it. A settlement layer is only as trustworthy as the records underneath it, which is why the reconciliation and drift-detection requirements in Section 11 are treated as launch-blocking rather than operational nice-to-haves.

4.6 Tournaments

The tournament engine runs entry-fee competitions with configurable prize distribution and an explicit house margin, in a defined lifecycle from announced through gathering, starting, in-progress, and completed. Brackets advance under a concurrency guard, so the match that finishes last is deterministically the one that builds the next round rather than two matches racing to build it twice.

Two configuration properties matter for the token economy. First, the prize split carries a named house-margin percentage, which means tournament rake is a first-class, already-implemented revenue line rather than something to be retrofitted — Section 10.3 assigns it the highest burn share of any revenue source.

Second, matchmaking carries an explicit switch for whether bots may fill empty slots, and a policy for odd player counts. Both are directly relevant to the disclosure requirements in Section 12.

4.7 Social and retention layer

SYSTEM	WHAT IT DOES	TOKEN RELEVANCE
Referrals	Pays a signup bonus and an ongoing commission on referred players' withdrawals; one-referral-per-user guard enforced at the database level	The acquisition channel that the Airdrop and points season plug into
Leaderboards	Ranked standings driving competitive return visits	Qualification surface for tournaments funded from Player Rewards
Friends and challenges	Direct challenge into a private room	Player-to-player transfers are free and instant — velocity with no sell pressure
Daily rewards, milestones, spin	Return-visit incentives and progression rewards	Migrates onto the Player Rewards bucket with a hard monthly budget cap
Missions and progression	XP and level tracking per player	Basis for the pre-token points season described in Section 9.6

4.8 Operations

An internal console covers user administration, withdrawal review, payment requests, bonus claims, support, tournaments, per-game configuration, and platform settings. Two properties of it matter here. Money rules — deposit fees, exchange rates, the currency conversion rate — live in database settings rather than source constants, so the person who needs to change them does not need a deployment to do it. And the withdrawal queue records send-attempt bookkeeping before broadcasting, so a payout whose outcome is ambiguous after a failure is deterministically reconcilable rather than requiring someone to inspect a block explorer by hand.

SECTION 5

THE THREE-CURRENCY MODEL

The platform operates three distinct units of value. Keeping them separate is the most important operating discipline in the entire design, because mixing them is the single most likely path to insolvency.

5.1 The three units




Figure 5.1 — Three units, three different backings. Coins are fiat-pegged so that a player's idle balance carries no token price exposure. A player who deposits \$100 sees \$100 tomorrow regardless of what TXX does.

5.2 Why Coins are fiat-pegged

It would be simpler to denominate player balances in TXX. It would also be wrong. A player who deposits money to enter a competition is not making an investment decision, and exposing their idle balance to token volatility converts a gaming product into an unwanted trading position. Worse, it makes the platform's liability to that player move with a price it partly influences.

Fiat-pegging the play currency and holding the reserve in stablecoin removes both problems. The player carries no token exposure. The platform's liability is stable and measurable. And TXX is left free to do the job it is actually good at — settling, discounting, and absorbing rake — without being forced to double as a store of customer deposits.

5.3 The two-wallet ledger

Withdrawable and non-withdrawable value are held in structurally separate wallets, not distinguished by a flag on one balance. This is a deliberate architectural choice: a flag can be wrong, and the failure mode of a wrong flag is paying out money that was never funded.




Figure 5.2 — Two-wallet ledger. The absence of a direct Bonus-to-withdrawal path is an explicit tested invariant, not a business rule enforced by convention.

The rules the ledger enforces:

1. Bonus Coins can never be withdrawn directly, under any code path.
2. Winnings from Bonus Coin play move to the Cash wallet only once a wagering requirement is met.
3. Bonus winnings paid out are drawn from the Player Rewards bucket and paid in TXX. **The platform does not sell TXX to fund payouts.**
4. Cash Coins are spent before Bonus Coins in any match, unless the player elects otherwise.
5. The reserve ratio is recalculated on every balance-affecting event.
6. New bonus issuance halts automatically if the reserve ratio falls below its floor.
7. Every Coin movement leaves an immutable, exportable audit record.
8. Bonus Coins expire after a configurable period.

Rule 3 deserves emphasis because it is a structural choice with a market consequence. If the platform had to sell TXX on the open market to pay promotional winnings, the promotion would generate sell pressure proportional to its own success. Paying from a pre-allocated bucket means the tokens were already accounted for in the emission schedule, and the player receives an asset they may hold, stake, or sell as they choose.

5.4 Reserve and solvency policy

Customer deposits are a liability, not revenue. They are never burned and never spent on operations. When a player deposits for withdrawable Coins, that value is theirs, and it is held in reserve until they play it or withdraw it.

This is the rule that keeps the platform solvent, and it constrains the token design in a way worth making explicit: **deposit principal is architecturally incapable of reaching the burn path**. Burn is funded from rake — the platform's earned revenue — and from nothing else. A design that burned a share of deposits would show impressive burn figures and would be unable to pay its players.

CONTROL	POLICY
Reserve denomination	Stablecoin or fiat. Never TXX. TXX deposits are converted on receipt.
Reserve ratio	≥110% of total withdrawable balance at all times
Segregation	Held in a separate account, never commingled with operating funds
Burn source	Rake only. Never deposit principal.
Bonus funding	Player Rewards bucket only. Never cash reserve.
Monitoring	Automated and real-time; alert below 115%, halt new bonus issuance below 110%
Concentration	Reserve split across more than one stablecoin issuer, or partly held in bank fiat
Reporting	Reserve ratio published as part of the monthly transparency report




Figure 5.3 — Solvency control loop. The reserve floor is enforced as a tested invariant, not a monitoring dashboard.

SECTION 6

TXX-FIRST SETTLEMENT

6.1 The principle

TXX is the settlement layer underneath. Every other currency is an on-ramp.

However a player funds their account, the platform settles matches in TXX, takes rake in TXX, and burns a portion of that rake. Settlement here means the platform ledger, denominated in TXX — a match moves balances in the ledger, not on a chain; see Section 1.5. The player never needs to know, and nothing about their experience changes.




Figure 6.1 — Settlement flow. The burn share is a governed parameter bounded in code, not a fixed constant — see Section 10.3.

6.2 Rake structure

The rake a player pays depends on how they funded their account. The differential is the primary demand mechanism for TXX: it makes holding and paying in the token measurably cheaper than not doing so, without ever requiring it.




Figure 6.2 — The rake ladder. A player funding in TXX and staking at the top tier pays a fifth of what a card-funding player pays. Percentages are indicative and subject to final confirmation against payment processing costs.

6.3 Withdrawal fees

Every withdrawal in TXX is, economically, a potential market sell. The fee schedule is therefore structured to make holding TXX the cheapest and fastest option, so that the exit path with the least sell pressure is also the one most attractive to the player.

WITHDRAWAL METHOD	FEE	SPEED	RECEIVED ON \$500
Fiat / card	3.5%	1–3 days	\$482.50
USDT	2.0%	~1 hour	\$490.00
TXX	0.5%	Instant	\$497.50

Player-to-player transfers are free and instant. Because the token carries no transfer tax, this is native behaviour rather than something the platform has to subsidise — and internal transfers create velocity with zero sell pressure.

6.4 Phasing — settlement is switched on gradually

Routing all platform volume into a newly created token pool on day one produces poor execution, front-running, and a broken price chart. A chart broken in week one is permanent, and every exchange approached for the following three years will see it. Settlement is therefore phased against liquidity depth rather than switched on at launch.

PHASE	TIMING	STATE
1	TGE	TXX optional, carries the best rake. All other currencies unchanged.
2	TGE + 3 months	TXX becomes the default pre-selected funding option.
3	TGE + 6 months, liquidity permitting	Full TXX-first settlement across all rails.

TREASURY INVENTORY, NOT PER-DEPOSIT BUYS

The platform does not execute an on-chain market buy per individual deposit — the gas cost, slippage, MEV exposure, and latency would all be unacceptable. Accounts are credited instantly from a TXX treasury inventory, which is replenished by batched, scheduled market purchases with slippage protection, at randomised timing. All purchase and sale activity is logged and publicly reportable.

SECTION 7

TOKEN UTILITY

7.1 Utility by participant

Following the convention of setting out what each participant *uses* the token for and what each participant *earns* it through:

PARTICIPANT	USES TXX FOR	RECEIVES TXX FROM
Casual player	Funding an account at the lowest rake tier; entering tournaments; withdrawing instantly at the lowest fee	Match winnings; daily and milestone rewards; the airdrop, if they earned points before launch
Competitive player	Tournament entry; private-room stakes; staking for a lower rake and priority matchmaking	Prize pools; leaderboard and season rewards; staking rewards
Staker	Locking to obtain a fee tier and its associated benefits	Staking emissions from the Staking bucket — never a share of platform revenue
Third-party studio	Operating a title on the platform; funding their own prize pools and player incentives	Ecosystem grants; their revenue share from titles they operate
Referrer	Nothing required — the referral system needs no stake	Signup bonuses and ongoing commission on referred players' activity
Treasury	Partnerships, listings, market-making agreements, ecosystem funding	Scheduled vesting release; forfeited unclaimed airdrop allocations

7.2 Staking

Staking exists to take supply off the market and to reward the players who use the platform most. Its benefits are consumption benefits — discounts on fees the platform charges, and access to features — and deliberately nothing more.




Figure 7.1 — Staking ladder. Every benefit is a discount on a fee the platform charges or access to a feature. None is a distribution of platform earnings.

A deliberate omission

An earlier draft of this design gave the top staking tier a share of platform revenue. It was removed on purpose. A token that pays holders a share of company profits in exchange for a passive stake is close to the textbook description of an investment contract in several jurisdictions, and it is the fastest available route to having TXX classified as a security. Fee discounts are consumption benefits; revenue distributions are not. **Revenue sharing will not be reintroduced without a written legal opinion.**

7.3 The value loop

The mechanism connecting platform activity to token supply is deliberately short, with no step that depends on speculation:




Figure 7.2 — The value loop. Each arrow is a mechanical consequence of the one before it. The loop's throughput is set entirely by contested volume — which is why Section 10.4 states the volume required for burn to offset emission rather than asserting that it will be reached.

TOKEN SPECIFICATION

8.1 Parameters

PARAMETER	VALUE
Name	TokenXGames
Symbol	TXX
Network	BNB Smart Chain mainnet — chain ID 56
Testnet	BSC Testnet — chain ID 97
Standard	BEP-20 (functionally ERC-20) + ERC20Burnable + ERC20Permit (EIP-2612)
Decimals	18
Total supply	100,000,000 TXX
Supply model	Fixed. Minted once in the constructor.
Base library	OpenZeppelin Contracts v5.x, unmodified
Compiler	Fixed pragma matching the verified build — never floating
Ownership	Token contract is not ownable. No admin, no minter, no pauser.

On decimals: 18 is the EVM default and the assumption made by every exchange, aggregator, wallet, and DEX router. Non-standard decimals cause integration failures and listing delays, and there is no upside to deviating.

On the network: BNB Chain improves alignment with the largest venues for this asset class. It also materially reduces the likelihood of a Coinbase listing, since Coinbase supports a limited set of BEP-20 assets. That trade-off has been made deliberately. No cross-chain bridge is in scope.

8.2 Contract architecture

```
contract TokenXGames is ERC20, ERC20Burnable, ERC20Permit {
    uint256 public constant MAX_SUPPLY = 100_000_000 * 10**18;

    constructor(address[9] memory buckets, uint256[9] memory amounts)
        ERC20("TokenXGames", "TXX")
        ERC20Permit("TokenXGames")
    {
        uint256 total;
        for (uint256 i = 0; i < 9; i++) {
            require(buckets[i] != address(0), "zero address");
```

```

        _mint(buckets[i], amounts[i]);
        total += amounts[i];
    }
    require(total == MAX_SUPPLY, "supply mismatch");
}

```

The entire supply is created and distributed in one transaction. The constructor reverts on any zero address and reverts unless the distributed total equals `MAX_SUPPLY` exactly, so a mis-parameterised deployment fails rather than producing a wrong-supply token. No tokens are ever held at an externally owned account.

All privileged behaviour lives in satellite contracts — vesting, staking, burn, emission control — which hold or receive tokens but cannot alter the token itself. `ERC20Permit` is not optional: without it, every player action requiring an allowance would cost an additional on-chain transaction and an additional sponsored gas payment.

8.3 What the contract must not contain

Each of the following is grounds for rejection at tier-1 exchange review, and none will be present:

PROHIBITED	REASON
Any <code>mint()</code> function	Breaks the fixed-supply guarantee
Transfer tax, fee-on-transfer, reflection, rebasing	Breaks DEX routers, aggregators and exchange accounting
Blacklist / allowlist on transfer	Custodial risk; disqualifying at most venues
Pausable transfers	Centralisation risk
Upgradeable proxy on the token	The bytecode users audit must be the bytecode that runs
Max wallet / max transaction limits	Breaks market making and large orders
Owner-callable balance manipulation	Disqualifying
Floating pragma	Verified source may not match deployed bytecode
Undocumented functions	Automatic audit failure

THE ACCEPTED COST OF THIS DESIGN

Because there is no pause function, a compromised satellite contract cannot be frozen. This is a deliberate trade: pausability is a centralisation vector that disqualifies a token at most serious venues, and the mitigations chosen instead are a minimal attack surface, independent audit, a live bug bounty, and privileged functions held behind a multisig and timelock. It is stated here rather than buried because it is a real risk that a reader is entitled to weigh.

Geo-restriction is enforced at the backend and API layer only. There is no on-chain restriction of any kind.

8.4 Access control




Figure 8.1 — Access control topology. The token and the vesting schedules sit outside the governance perimeter entirely: there is no key, no vote, and no procedure that can change them after deployment.

SECTION 9

TOKEN ECONOMICS

Every figure in this section is generated from the allocation and vesting schedule below. None is carried over from earlier internal drafts.

9.1 Allocation



Figure 9.1 — Supply allocation. All 100,000,000 TXX are minted at deployment into ten separate, publicly documented contract addresses, each independently verifiable on BscScan.

#	BUCKET	%	TOKENS	TGE UNLOCK	CLIFF	VESTING
1	 Liquidity	8%	8,000,000	4,480,000 – 7,952,000	—	Paired into the launch pool at TGE; the amount is set by the liquidity percentage, and the unused remainder stays in the multisig
2	 Marketing	10%	10,000,000	0	—	After DEX launch — schedule to be confirmed
3	 Ecosystem & Developer Grants	15%	15,000,000	0	6 mo	84 mo linear
4	 Team & Advisors	15%	15,000,000	0	12 mo	60 mo linear
5	 Staking & Node Incentives	15%	15,000,000	0	—	48 mo linear
6	 Public Sale (PinkSale)	14%	14,000,000	2,800,000	—	9 mo linear
7	 Player Rewards & Tournaments	8%	8,000,000	160,000	1 mo	60 mo tapering
8	 Treasury / Foundation	7%	7,000,000	350,000	6 mo	60 mo linear
9	 Airdrop / Community	3%	3,000,000	600,000	—	18 mo linear
10	 Private / Seed	5%	5,000,000	0	6 mo	24 mo linear
Total		100%	100,000,000	8,390,000 – 11,862,000	Float at TGE: 8.39%–11.86% of supply	

Two things this table assumes, stated so no reader has to infer them. Every percentage — including the float at TGE — is measured against the 100,000,000 tokens *minted*, not against a later post-burn supply; burning reduces the numerator and denominator of different things, so the two must not be mixed. And the TGE column assumes the public round clears its full 14,000,000. A partial sale reduces the TGE unlock and the launch pool *together* and in proportion, so both ends of the range fall while the pool-depth ratio in Section 9.5 is unchanged; whatever goes unsold is burned rather than retained (Section 9.5).

9.2 What each bucket is for

LIQUIDITY — 8%

A token is not automatically tradeable; someone has to place tokens and real money side by side in a pool. Launching with a thin pool means a moderate buy moves the price violently, a bot sells into it, and the chart is permanently damaged in week one. This bucket exists to prevent that, and it has exactly one job: funding the token side of the launch pool.

The whole 8,000,000 is available for that pairing. It is transferred into PinkSale's presale contract before the sale opens; at finalization PinkSale pairs it with a configured percentage of the raised funds, creates the pool, and locks the LP tokens for 36 months through its own locking contract, so anyone can verify independently that the team cannot withdraw them.

How much of the bucket is actually used depends on the liquidity percentage, because the pool's token side is set by the funds raised and the launch price rather than chosen directly. That has a consequence worth stating plainly: **the pool cannot be made arbitrarily deep**. Above roughly 71% the pairing would require more tokens than the bucket holds and simply cannot be funded. The exact figure is fixed before the sale opens and published with the sale terms.

One thing this allocation deliberately does not include is a market-making reserve. Earlier drafts held back a much larger tranche for that purpose, released under a published policy. That tranche is gone, which removes a block of discretionary supply from the schedule entirely — but it also means no tokens are set aside for post-launch market making, and any such inventory would have to come from elsewhere. Stated here rather than left for a reader to infer from the absence.

MARKETING — 10%

Funds user acquisition and marketing after the DEX listing — the spend that turns a working platform into a used one. Section 10 is explicit that the burn engine is driven by rake, and rake is a function of contested volume; this bucket is what buys that volume.

Nothing unlocks at TGE. None of these 10,000,000 tokens can reach the market on launch day or be sold into the launch pool, and they form no part of the day-one circulating supply discussed in Section 9.5.

The release schedule beyond that is not yet fixed, and this document will not pretend otherwise. An unscheduled allocation of this size is exactly the kind of thing an analyst should price as latent supply until a cliff and vesting period are published, and it will be published before TGE alongside the other schedules

in Section 9.3.

ECOSYSTEM & DEVELOPER GRANTS — 15%

Funding to pay outside studios to build on the platform. This is the bucket that pays for the transition described in Section 2.3. A studio with a strong competitive title and no payments capability is offered funding plus instant distribution; the platform gains a game it did not build, and the studio holds TXX and is therefore aligned with the network's success rather than being a vendor to it. Released slowly and against delivery, over seven years.

TEAM & ADVISORS — 15%

The 12-month cliff is the single most scrutinised number in this document. The fastest way to kill a token is for the founding team to sell in week one; it has happened hundreds of times, and every investor and every exchange compliance team checks the team lock first. If day-one selling is possible, they stop reading.

A 12-month cliff followed by a 60-month linear release says: we cannot profit unless this works for six years. That message costs nothing to send. A team member granted tokens receives nothing at all for twelve months; if they leave at month fourteen they keep roughly two months' worth and the remainder stays locked in the contract. The cliff is enforced on-chain and is verifiable by any third party without trusting the project.

STAKING & NODE INCENTIVES — 15%

Rewards for locking TXX rather than selling it. A player holding meaningful TXX can sell it or lock it; locking earns emissions and drops their match rake, which for an active player is a recurring saving. The tokens are then off the market. Rewards are funded from this bucket only, and the contract cannot distribute more than its balance.

PUBLIC SALE (PINKSALE) — 14%

Sold publicly shortly before launch. The governing rule is that the gap between sale price and launch price must be small: sell at a tenth of the launch price and every buyer is up 10× on day one, and every one of them sells.

PLAYER REWARDS & TOURNAMENTS — 8%

Prize pools, tournaments, daily rewards, and promotional bonus funding. The release tapers deliberately — more early to attract players, less later, when the platform should be good enough that people play to win rather than because they are being paid to appear. Every successful game economy reduces free rewards over time; every failed one did not.

TREASURY / FOUNDATION — 7%

The company reserve in token form: partnerships, listings, and opportunities that require the ability to say yes without raising money or selling on the market. Spending requires multiple signatures — one person must never be able to move the treasury alone.

AIRDROP / COMMUNITY — 3%

Tokens for real users who supported the platform early, distributed via a Merkle distributor against a pre-token points season. Only 20% unlocks at launch; releasing 100% at launch hands free tokens to people whose only rational move is to sell. See Section 9.6.

PRIVATE / SEED — 5%

Deliberately small against a typical 15–20%. Every cheaply-sold token is a token that will eventually be sold at a profit, and that is structural sell pressure created at inception. Because the platform has a live product and revenue, it does not need to give away as much as a whitepaper-only project. The trade-off is honest: less dilution, but materially less cash raised, which places more weight on the public sale.

9.3 Vesting schedule




Figure 9.2 — Vesting schedule. Release is continuous, accruing per block rather than in monthly steps: monthly cliffs create predictable dump windows that market participants front-run.

Immutability. Schedules are enforced on-chain and cannot be altered after deployment by any party, including the deployer. No function may release tokens ahead of schedule. There is no escape hatch, no emergency drain, and no sweep function. Every vesting contract exposes public view functions — `totalAllocation()`, `released()`, `releasable()`, `vestingStart()`, `cliffEnd()`, `vestingEnd()`, `beneficiary()` — so that third parties can build independent unlock trackers.

9.4 Emission and circulating supply




Figure 9.3 — Scheduled circulating supply. Excludes the 10,000,000 Marketing bucket, whose release schedule is not yet fixed; the curve therefore approaches 90% rather than 100% as the scheduled buckets complete. The previously excluded 16,800,000 policy-gated liquidity reserve no longer exists — the Liquidity bucket is now 8,000,000, of which the portion paired into the launch pool enters at TGE and the remainder stays in the multisig.

MONTH	NEW RELEASE	CIRCULATING	% OF SUPPLY
TGE	—	8,390,000 – 11,862,000	8.39% – 11.86%
1	1,779,167	12,089,167	12.09%
6	1,946,439	21,821,364	21.82%
12	1,027,511	27,986,429	27.99%
18	1,270,238	35,607,857	35.61%
24	1,136,905	42,429,286	42.43%
36	991,905	55,082,143	55.08%
48	971,905	66,745,000	66.74%
60	619,405	74,177,857	74.18%




Figure 9.4 — Monthly release. Peak scheduled release is 1,946,439 TXX, in months 2-6. Emission declines materially thereafter and falls below 1,000,000/month from month 31.

WHERE THE EARLY EMISSION COMES FROM

Roughly two-thirds of the months 2-6 peak is the public-sale tranche releasing over six months. This is the highest-emission window in the entire schedule and it falls immediately after launch, which is the period in which a token can least absorb it. It is disclosed here rather than smoothed over. The public-sale release period is among the parameters still open ahead of the sale; extending it to twelve months would reduce peak scheduled emission by approximately 13%.

9.5 Sale rounds

The gap between each round and the launch price is deliberately narrow.

ROUND	PRICE	TOKENS	MULTIPLE TO LAUNCH	LOCK
Private / Seed	\$0.03	5,000,000	1.7×	6-month cliff, 24-month vest
Public (PinkSale)	\$0.04	14,000,000	1.25×	20% at TGE, 9-month linear
Launch	\$0.05	—	—	—

IMPLIED FDV AT LAUNCH	MARKET CAP AT TGE	CHEAP-TOKEN SHARE
\$5,000,000 100M × \$0.05	\$420k–\$593k 8.4M–11.9M float × \$0.05	3% vs 15–20% typical

The public round runs on PinkSale and nowhere else. There is no parallel sale on TokenXGames's own site, which matters for two reasons a buyer can verify rather than take on trust. The 14,000,000 TXX are minted directly into PinkSale's presale contract at deployment — they never sit in a TokenXGames wallet at any

point — and the release schedule above is enforced by that same contract, which is independently audited and has settled many prior launches. The trading pool is created and its LP tokens locked by PinkSale's own finalize function, so exactly one pool exists and no second pool is created by hand.

Anything left unsold is burned. If the round does not clear its full 14,000,000, the remainder is not returned to the treasury, not held back for a later round, and not quietly re-allocated — PinkSale's unsold-token receiver is set to the same burn address published for the rake burn in Section 10, and the transfer happens inside the finalize transaction that creates the trading pool. It is set before the sale opens and cannot be changed afterwards, so it is verifiable in advance rather than promised. The practical effect is that an under-subscribed sale permanently reduces total supply instead of leaving discretionary inventory in the team's hands.

Two consequences of that are worth stating rather than leaving a reader to work out. This is a *one-time* supply reduction at listing, entirely separate from the ongoing rake-funded burn described in Section 10, and it is reported as its own event rather than counted toward any monthly burn figure. And because it happens at DEX listing — the same transaction that creates the pool — there is no second burn at a later CEX listing; by then no unsold tokens remain.

WHAT HOLDS THE PRICE AFTER THE SALE CLOSES

The common failure at this point is well understood and worth naming: a presale closes, every buyer can sell immediately, the pool is too thin to absorb it, and the chart never recovers. Two things are set deliberately to prevent that, and one number decides whether they are enough.

The first is that most of the sale cannot be sold on day one. Only the 20% TGE portion — **2,800,000 TXX of the 14,000,000** — is claimable when trading opens. The other 11,200,000 releases across the following nine months, enforced by PinkSale's contract rather than by a promise.

The second is that the pool's depth is chosen rather than inherited. Because the token side comes from the Liquidity bucket (Section 9.2) and not from the sale allocation, the platform decides how deep the launch pool is by setting the liquidity percentage on PinkSale.

The number that matters is the ratio between those two: how much can be sold at TGE, measured against how much is sitting in the pool to absorb it.

LIQUIDITY PERCENTAGE	TXX IN THE LAUNCH POOL	TGE-UNLOCKED SALE TOKENS AS A SHARE
40%	4,480,000	
60%	6,720,000	
71%	7,952,000	

Three properties of that table are worth drawing out, because each is counter-intuitive and each is load-bearing.

The ratio does not depend on how much the sale raises. The sale price is fixed at \$0.04, so raising less money and selling fewer tokens are the same event — an under-subscribed round, whose unsold remainder is burned as described above. That produces a proportionally smaller pool *and* a proportionally smaller TGE unlock; the two move together and cancel. A sale that reaches a third of its target lands in exactly the same ratio as one that sells out. The absolute pool is shallower, so any single large order moves price further, but the structural relationship between unlocked supply and pool depth is unchanged. Liquidity percentage is the only lever that moves it.

The ceiling is arithmetic, not preference. Above roughly 71% the pool's token side would exceed the entire 8,000,000 bucket and could not be funded at all. That is the upper bound on this decision regardless of how deep one would like the pool to be.

Even at the ceiling the figure is not small. At the 71% ceiling, day-one sellable supply still equals 35% of the pool. This is stated rather than smoothed over: no configuration available here makes the TGE unlock negligible against launch liquidity, and a reader modelling an entry should assume real downward pressure in the opening period. What the structure does is bound that pressure to a known fraction and stop the remaining 11,200,000 from joining it for nine months.

Proceeds are directed to platform engineering and infrastructure, security auditing and the bug bounty programme, liquidity provision and market making, licensing and compliance, and user acquisition. The final split is confirmed before the sale opens and published with the sale terms.

9.6 The points season

Before the token exists, players earn points for matches played, tournaments won, and friends referred. Points are records on the platform's own servers — they carry no cost and create no token liability. At launch, points convert into the Airdrop allocation through a Merkle distributor.

This is the highest-value thing the platform can do ahead of a token launch: it grows users, costs nothing today, and builds genuine launch-day holding from people who feel they earned their allocation, rather than recipients whose only rational move is to sell. Two mechanisms reduce that residual sell pressure further, at no cost to the project: a delayed-claim multiplier funded from the unclaimed pool, and a claim deadline after which unclaimed allocations are forfeited back to Treasury. Airdrop claim rates typically run 60–80%, and forfeited tokens are supply that never has to be defended.

Sequencing note

Promising future tokens in exchange for participation may itself constitute an unregistered offering in some jurisdictions. The points season is structured to avoid any binding promise of conversion and is subject to legal review before launch.

BUYBACK AND BURN

10.1 Burn sources

SOURCE	BURNABLE?
Rake earned on gameplay	Yes — the only <i>recurring</i> burn source
Unsold public-sale tokens	Yes — but once only, at listing (see 9.5)
Customer deposit principal	No — this is a customer liability
Bonus Coin funding	No — this is the Player Rewards bucket
Treasury tokens	Not meaningful — see 10.2

The two burnable rows are deliberately kept apart in reporting. The rake burn is a continuing stream funded by real revenue, and it is what every figure in this section is measured against. The unsold-token burn is a single event at listing, funded by nothing and repeatable never; folding it into a monthly burn total would flatter the recurring number by an amount that has no bearing on whether the engine works. It is therefore reported as its own line, once.

It is worth being precise about why unsold sale tokens qualify at all when treasury tokens do not, since 10.2 immediately below argues that burning tokens which were never for sale is theatre. The distinction is whether the tokens were headed for the market. Unsold public-sale tokens were committed to the presale contract and were going to be sold to buyers who would have been free to trade them; burning them removes real latent supply that would otherwise have overhung the price. Treasury tokens were never on that path. Neither burn creates buy pressure — only the rake burn does that — but one removes supply that was genuinely coming and the other removes supply that was not.

10.2 Why treasury burns do not count

Only tokens bought on the open market with revenue are burned and reported as burns. Burning tokens that already sit in the treasury makes total supply look smaller while changing nothing about actual market dynamics, because those tokens were never for sale. A market buyback creates real buy pressure *and* removes supply; a treasury burn does neither.

Treasury burns are theatre. TokenXGames will not represent them as meaningful supply reduction, and the public burn dashboard reports market-purchased burns as a separate and primary figure.

10.3 Burn allocation

REVENUE SOURCE	TO BUYBACK & BURN
Match rake (all currencies, including fiat)	40%
Tournament entry fees	50%
Premium items / battle pass	60%
Third-party studio revenue share	25%

The burn rate is a multisig-adjustable parameter bounded 0–75% in code, not a hard-coded constant. Burns execute weekly, on-chain by contract wherever possible, at randomised timing through private mempool submission — scheduled, predictable buybacks are trivially front-run. Bounded slippage is enforced in the contract, which reverts on excess. Every burn emits an indexed event carrying amount, timestamp, revenue source, and currency of origin.

The rules governing a burn and the moment a burn happens are deliberately held at two different levels of control. The parameters — maximum size per execution, maximum tolerated slippage, minimum interval between burns — are set only by the multisig through the 48-hour timelock, so any change to how burns may behave is public two days before it takes effect. Execution itself sits outside the timelock, callable by an automated keeper constrained to stay inside those already-approved bounds. This is not a weakening of the timelock; it is what makes the randomised timing above meaningful. A burn queued publicly for 48 hours would announce its size and approximate moment to precisely the front-runners the private submission is meant to defeat. Slow, visible rules; unpredictable execution.

Execution routes through a single venue at launch. PancakeSwap v3 is the only pool with meaningful TXX liquidity on day one, so splitting a purchase across venues would have nothing to split across; the capability is deferred until a second venue exists rather than built speculatively.

10.4 The burn benchmark

Neutral supply pressure requires burns to exceed the tokens actually reaching the market from scheduled release. Assuming 40% of released tokens are sold:




Figure 10.1 — Burn benchmark against realistic phasing. These figures describe the burn volume at which supply pressure is neutral. They are a benchmark, not a forecast.

Read this honestly

Reaching the year-one benchmark at launch scale is **not** a realistic expectation, and this document does not claim it. Burn is a function of contested volume, and contested volume is a function of active players. In year one the platform expects to reach roughly a quarter to two-fifths of the benchmark, which means net supply pressure is negative and the price is likely to drift down. That is a normal and survivable phase for a token whose emission schedule begins before its revenue matures — provided user growth continues. It is not survivable if it does not.

The legitimate lever for closing that gap is a longer vesting schedule, which lowers the benchmark permanently and at no cost, and which is why the extended schedule in Section 9.3 was selected. It is not a more optimistic revenue forecast.

SECTION 11

TECHNOLOGY AND SECURITY

11.1 Custody and keys

A material share of players arrive via card payments and have no wallet at all. The custody model must serve that journey without compromising the players who do hold wallets. Private keys are held in a managed KMS, a hardware security module, or an equivalent vault. **Environment variables, configuration files, and database storage are not acceptable under any circumstances.** Hot wallet balances are capped; treasury and reserve are held in multisig only; outflows above defined thresholds trigger automated alerting.

11.2 Transaction safety

REQUIREMENT	DETAIL
Confirmation depth	Minimum 15 blocks on BNB Smart Chain before crediting, reflecting fast finality
Idempotency	Every request carries an idempotency key; duplicates never double-execute
Reconciliation	Automatic and continuous, with drift detection, alerting and halt
Atomicity	A failed transaction mid-match rolls back in-game state atomically
Reorg handling	Explicit detection and rollback
Rate limiting	Per-wallet and per-IP on all write endpoints
Withdrawal caps	Configurable per-wallet daily cap
Circuit breaker	Automatic halt on abnormal aggregate outflow; manual restart only
Chargebacks	Holding periods on new accounts, velocity limits, and reserve provisioning — a card payment can reverse weeks after winnings were withdrawn

Players do not need BNB to play; gas is sponsored. Indexing is event-driven rather than polled, and staking tier is resolved inside the match-start path without an RPC round-trip, so the token layer never becomes a latency tax on gameplay.

11.3 Audit and testing

ITEM	REQUIREMENT
Independent audit	Required before mainnet. No unresolved high or critical findings. Report published publicly. Re-audit after any post-audit code change.
Testnet soak	Four weeks on BSC Testnet before mainnet
Coverage	≥95% line and branch
Fuzz testing	Required on vesting, staking, burn and ledger contracts
Fork testing	Against BNB Chain mainnet state
Time-travel tests	Full 60-month vesting simulation
Bug bounty	Public programme live at or before TGE

INVARIANTS HELD UNDER FUZZING

```
totalSupply() == 100_000_000e18           // always, forever
sum(all balances) == totalSupply()
totalMinted == totalSupply() + totalBurned
vestedAmount(t) <= totalAllocation         // per bucket
vestedAmount(t) == 0 for all t < cliffEnd   // per bucket, TGE excepted
stakingRewardsDistributed <= stakingPoolBalance
reserveRatio >= 110                       // percent, at all times
effectiveFeeRate >= 100                   // 1.00% floor, basis points
emissionMultiplier in [5000, 15000]       // 0.5x – 1.5x, basis points
bonusCoins.withdrawablePath == NONE        // no code path exists
```

11.4 Deployment sequence

Deployment follows a fixed order, because deviating from it creates windows in which tokens sit unprotected:

1. Deploy the multisig (3-of-5) and verify every signer.
2. Deploy the timelock with a 48-hour delay.
3. Create the public sale on PinkSale and obtain its presale contract address. This happens *before* the token is deployed, because the token's constructor mints the public sale allocation directly to that address.
4. Deploy the eight in-house bucket contracts — vesting, distributor, staking pool, emission controller. The public sale is not among them; it is held by PinkSale's own audited presale contract, not by anything built here.
5. Verify every bucket contract on BscScan.
6. Deploy the token, passing the eight in-house addresses plus the PinkSale presale address. Only addresses are passed — every bucket amount is a named constant compiled into the contract, so there is no array of amounts that could be reordered or transposed at deployment.
7. Verify the token contract on BscScan.
8. Assert on-chain that `totalSupply() == MAX_SUPPLY` and each bucket balance matches specification.
9. Transfer all roles to the timelock; timelock admin to the multisig.
10. Deployer renounces every remaining role, and publishes the renunciation transaction.
11. Publish all addresses.
12. Create the liquidity pool.
13. Lock LP tokens for 36 months via a public locking service.
14. Publish the LP lock transaction hash.

Within 24 hours of deployment the following are published: token contract address, all ten bucket addresses — the nine held in-house plus PinkSale's presale contract, which holds the public sale allocation — multisig address and signer threshold, timelock address and delay, staking contract, burn contract and burn destination, LP lock transaction, and deployer address.

GAME INTEGRITY

This section is placed prominently and stated plainly because it is the single largest determinant of whether a real-money gaming platform survives, and because a reader is entitled to know the current state rather than an aspiration.

12.1 Current state

Game outcomes today are resolved **server-side and server-authoritatively**. That is the correct foundation — any outcome-determining logic running on a client will eventually be manipulated — and it is what the platform already does. Match state, moves, and results are recorded server-side, and the ledger retains a full record of each match including its opponent type.

What server-authoritative resolution does *not* provide is independent verifiability. A player currently has no cryptographic means of checking, after the fact, that a result was produced fairly.

Two specific gaps are named here rather than left to a general statement about engineering consistency. First, **randomness generation is not uniform across engines**: some resolve outcomes using a cryptographically secure source, while at least one engine resolves paid outcomes using a non-cryptographic pseudo-random generator, on a distribution further skewed by a rule suppressing certain repeated values. Second, **some engines expose house-configurable parameters that affect computer-controlled opponents** — including, in one engine, a difficulty setting that grants a bot a measurable dice advantage. Human players' own rolls are not tilted by that mechanism; the exposure is that a player may face an advantaged bot without that being disclosed to them.

Stated without qualification

TokenXGames makes no claim of provable fairness for the platform as it exists today. Provable fairness is a pre-TGE engineering deliverable, described below. Any outcome-influencing parameter that survives into the token era will be disclosed, bounded, and published — or removed. This is a launch gate, not a roadmap aspiration, and the token will not be deployed to mainnet before it is closed.

12.2 What must ship before TGE

REQUIREMENT	APPROACH	STATUS
Verifiable randomness	Commit-reveal for latency-sensitive real-time play, with a verifiable random function for high-value and tournament outcomes. Seeds published so any past result can be independently recomputed.	PRE-TGE
Uniform RNG	A single cryptographically secure randomness source across every engine, with no engine-local variation and no distribution-shaping rules.	PRE-TGE
Removal of outcome tilting	Any parameter capable of biasing a match outcome in a paid game is removed. Configuration is limited to stakes, limits, timing and format.	PRE-TGE
Bot disclosure	Bots restricted to free and practice modes. Where a bot appears in any paid context, it is disclosed prominently before the player commits funds, along with any advantage its difficulty setting carries. Opponent type is written to the ledger by every engine, and surfaced to the player.	PRE-TGE
Player-side verification	A public tool letting any player recompute any past match result from published seeds and the recorded move log.	PRE-TGE
Disconnection policy	Published, deterministic per-game rules for mid-match disconnection, with full match replay logs retained.	PRE-TGE
Collusion detection	Detection for arranged play between accounts converting promotional value into withdrawable balance — the primary abuse vector in a PvP design with bonus funding.	PRE-TGE
Certified RNG	Third-party RNG certification as required by the licensing regime ultimately selected.	LICENSING




Figure 12.1 — Target fairness architecture. The property being bought is that a player need not trust the platform's word about a past result — they can recompute it.

SECTION 13

GOVERNANCE

TXX does not launch with a token-holder DAO, and this document does not promise one on a date. Governance is deliberately staged, and the staging is honest about what is genuinely decentralised at each point.

PHASE	CONTROL MODEL	WHAT HOLDERS INFLUENCE
1 — Launch	3-of-5 multisig behind a 48-hour timelock. Token and vesting immutable and outside the perimeter entirely.	Nothing binding. Every privileged action is visible on-chain 48 hours before it executes.
2 — Signalling	Multisig retains execution; off-chain signalling votes weighted by staked TXX.	Non-binding votes on burn rate, emission multiplier, tier thresholds, and grant priorities. Results and the team's response published.
3 — Delegated	Selected bounded parameters moved behind on-chain governance with a timelock.	Binding control of parameters already bounded in code — burn rate within 0–75%, emission multiplier within 0.5×–1.5×, staking thresholds.
4 — Treasury	Ecosystem grant allocation moved to on-chain proposal and vote.	Which studios receive grants, and on what terms.

WHAT GOVERNANCE WILL NEVER CONTROL

Total supply. Vesting schedules. The reserve floor. The Bonus-Coin withdrawal prohibition. The 1.0% rake floor. These are immutable or hard-bounded in code precisely so that no vote, no key, and no future governance process can reach them. A governance system that can vote to mint tokens or drain a reserve is not a safeguard.

Progression between phases is gated on real conditions — a functioning market, a distributed holder base, and legal clarity on governance participation — rather than on a calendar. Advancing a governance phase into a token held by a handful of addresses transfers control to those addresses, not to a community.

SECTION 14

ROADMAP




Figure 14.1 — Roadmap. No dates are attached to phases 2 onward. Token generation timing is a commercial decision driven by platform scale and legal readiness, not by contract completion.

ON LAUNCH TIMING

The emission schedule begins the moment the token is generated and runs on autopilot regardless of how the platform is performing. Every month of user growth achieved *before* generation starts the burn engine closer to the benchmark in Section 10.4. Launching early into a small user base means an extended period in which scheduled emission exceeds revenue-funded burn, and a long downtrend is difficult to recover from reputationally. The platform's stated intention is therefore to grow the player base and run a points season first, and to generate the token against a materially larger active user base than exists today.

SECTION 15

TRANSPARENCY AND REPORTING

The following are published monthly, whether or not targets are met. Analysts compute these figures from chain data regardless; publishing first is the only way to control the interpretation, and reporting a miss builds more credibility than reporting only wins.

METRIC	WHY IT IS PUBLISHED
Tokens burned this period and cumulative	Verifiable against chain data; the primary measure of the value loop working
Burn performance against the Section 10.4 benchmark	Including shortfalls, stated as shortfalls
Tokens released from vesting, and net supply change	The other side of the burn figure
Circulating supply	Derived from on-chain state, never maintained by hand
Staked supply and percentage of float	How much supply is genuinely off the market
Reserve ratio	The solvency measure that protects player funds
Payment mix — TXX vs fiat vs other crypto	Tracks settlement migration and the risk of fiat revenue cannibalisation
Holder concentration — top 10 and top 100	Whale accumulation distorts both the chart and staking tiers
Reconciliation drift — ledger against chain	Early warning on the integrity of the ledger the economy rests on

A public dashboard carries cumulative burns, circulating supply, burn rate against emission rate, and the reserve ratio. A public HTTP endpoint returns circulating supply as a plain number derived from on-chain state — total supply less unreleased vesting balances less burned tokens — which is a hard requirement for major aggregator and exchange listings.

Every significant vesting unlock is pre-announced at least seven days in advance, particularly the month-12 team cliff. Unannounced unlocks are read as concealment and reliably generate negative coverage. Silence is more expensive than disclosure.

RISK FACTORS

These are the risks the team considers material, stated in the order they are weighted internally. This list is not exhaustive, and the realisation of any of these could result in the total loss of value of TXX.

TOKEN AND MARKET

- **Emission exceeding burn.** The central arithmetic of Section 10.4. If contested volume does not grow into the emission schedule, net supply pressure remains negative for an extended period. This is the most likely adverse scenario, not the least.
- **Concentration of early emission.** Peak scheduled release falls in months 2–6, the period in which a new token is least able to absorb it.
- **Player Rewards bucket depletion.** The promotional bonus and tournament prize pools draw on the same finite bucket. Without a hard monthly cap and an instantly-operable kill switch, promotion at scale could exhaust it well ahead of schedule and leave nothing for tournaments.
- **Sector sentiment.** Gaming tokens are in a weak cycle. The project may execute well and still launch into a hostile market.
- **Whale concentration.** A small number of addresses accumulating cheaply can control the chart and distort staking tiers.
- **Liquidity and market-maker failure.** Market-making firms become insolvent or withdraw, emptying the order book. Low-volume tokens are also culled periodically by exchanges.
- **Payment mix cannibalisation.** TXX-first settlement working so well that fiat revenue declines while the cost base remains denominated in fiat.

REGULATORY AND LEGAL

- **Licensing.** Real-money gaming requires licensing in the jurisdictions of operation. Major exchanges will not list a token attached to unlicensed real-money gaming, and regulators can halt operations.
- **Securities classification.** Staking mechanics can cause a token to be treated as an investment contract. The design excludes revenue sharing for exactly this reason, but classification risk cannot be eliminated and differs by jurisdiction.
- **Responsible gambling and age verification.** Self-exclusion, deposit limits, reality checks and hard age verification are mandatory under most licensing regimes and are a genuine duty of care. Minors accessing real-money gaming is both a serious harm and a licence-ending event.
- **AML and transaction monitoring.** Crypto withdrawals above thresholds trigger reporting obligations, sanctions screening and suspicious-activity procedures.
- **Data protection and tax.** Multi-jurisdiction data protection obligations; corporate tax and VAT treatment of token issuance and gaming revenue; withholding on player winnings in some jurisdictions.
- **Trademark.** Name conflicts across gaming and financial classes in operating jurisdictions.

GAME INTEGRITY

- **Randomness integrity.** If players suspect outcomes are manipulated, trust is lost irrecoverably. This is the most common cause of death for real-money gaming platforms. See Section 12.
- **Undisclosed bot opponents.** Matching a player wagering real money against software without clear disclosure is a consumer-protection and fraud exposure, not a product decision.
- **Collusion and match-fixing.** In PvP with withdrawable winnings, two accounts under one operator can move promotional value into a withdrawable balance while losing only the rake.
- **Disconnection disputes.** Real-time play with money at stake generates support load and legal complaints from day one without published deterministic rules.

TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL

- **No pause function by design.** A compromised satellite contract cannot be frozen. This is an accepted cost of listing-compatible design (Section 8.3).
- **Hot wallet compromise.** The richest single target in the system.
- **MEV on treasury buybacks.** Predictable scheduled buybacks are trivially front-run; mitigated by randomised timing and private mempool submission, with execution held outside the timelock so the moment of a buyback is not published in advance.
- **Ledger drift.** The off-chain balance ledger diverging from on-chain reality.
- **Oracle manipulation.** Any price feed read by rake or tier logic is an attack surface; time-weighted feeds only, never spot.
- **Chain risk.** Outages or congestion affecting settlement.

BUSINESS CONTINUITY

- **Distribution dependency.** A messaging-platform policy change on real-money gaming could remove the primary distribution channel with little notice.
- **Payment processor de-risking.** Processors drop gaming and crypto merchants regularly and often without notice. More than one live processor is a structural requirement, not an optimisation.
- **Stablecoin issuer risk.** Reserve concentrated in a single stablecoin carries depeg and issuer risk.
- **Key person risk.** A small, founder-dependent team.

REPUTATIONAL

- **Team unlock coverage.** The month-12 cliff will be discussed publicly. Pre-announcement is the mitigation; silence reads as concealment.
- **Chart narrative.** An extended decline becomes the story regardless of fundamentals.
- **Visible exploitation.** Exploiters profiting publicly invites more and signals weak controls.

LEGAL AND COMPLIANCE

TXX is designed as a utility instrument. Its benefits are consumption benefits — discounts on fees the platform charges and access to platform features. It confers no revenue share, no profit participation, no dividend, and no equity or equity-like right. Wagering settlement is architecturally separated from the token contract so that TXX is not itself a wagering instrument.

ITEM	POSITION
Entity structure	The token issuer and the gaming operator are expected to be separate legal entities.
Gaming licence	Being obtained in an appropriate jurisdiction. Exchange listing and token generation are both gated on it.
Geo-restriction	Enforced at the application and API layer. No on-chain blacklist of any kind.
Age verification	Hard identity verification with age checks before any deposit. No exceptions.
Responsible gambling	Self-exclusion, deposit limits, loss limits and reality checks built before launch, not retrofitted.
AML / sanctions	Transaction monitoring, sanctions screening and reporting procedures.
Legal opinion	Written opinion on token classification obtained before generation.

Precedence. Legal structuring is in progress and may affect the design described in this document. Where any requirement here conflicts with advice from counsel, that advice takes precedence and a revised version of this document will be issued. No token generation, distribution, or mainnet deployment — including test deployments using the TXX name or symbol — occurs before legal sign-off.

GLOSSARY

Bonus Coins	Promotional play currency. Never directly withdrawable; winnings become withdrawable only after a wagering requirement is met.
Buyback and burn	Using revenue to purchase TXX on the open market and permanently destroy it.
Cliff	A period after which vesting begins, during which nothing is released.
Coins	The fiat-pegged in-game currency players actually play with. Withdrawable and reserve-backed.
Commit-reveal	A fairness scheme in which the server publishes a hash of a secret before play and the secret afterwards, so results can be verified retrospectively.
Float	Circulating supply — tokens released and freely transferable.
FDV	Fully diluted valuation: total supply multiplied by price.
House margin	The platform's share of a tournament prize pool.
Idempotency key	A token on a request guaranteeing that a repeated request executes only once.
MEV	Maximal extractable value — profit from reordering or front-running pending transactions.
Merkle distributor	A contract letting eligible recipients claim a pre-committed allocation by proof, without the issuer sending each one.
Multisig	A wallet requiring multiple independent signatures to act.
Playthrough	The wagering volume required before promotional winnings become withdrawable.
Rake	The platform's percentage of a contested pot.
Reserve ratio	Segregated reserve assets divided by total withdrawable player balances.
Server-authoritative	Outcome-determining logic runs on the server, never the client.
TGE	Token Generation Event — the moment supply is created and distributed.
Timelock	A contract enforcing a mandatory delay between scheduling a privileged action and executing it.

VRF

Verifiable random function — randomness accompanied by a proof that it was generated correctly.

CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION

TokenXGames is a working competitive gaming platform with real players, three live payment rails, and revenue. TXX is the settlement layer being introduced beneath it.

The design makes a small number of deliberate choices, and it is worth restating them together because they constrain each other. Player balances are fiat-pegged and reserve-backed, so a player carries no token exposure on money they have not chosen to expose. Burn is funded from rake and never from deposits, so the burn figure can never be inflated at the cost of solvency. Staking pays fee discounts and never revenue, so the token stays a utility instrument. The team holds a twelve-month cliff and a sixty-month vest, enforced on-chain where anyone can check it. And the token contract itself has no owner, no mint function, and no pause — the bytecode that is audited is the bytecode that runs, permanently.

Two things are stated in this document that a whitepaper would ordinarily omit. The first is that provable fairness is not yet a property of the platform, and that closing that gap is a gate on token generation rather than a line on a roadmap. The second is that the emission schedule outruns revenue-funded burn at launch scale, and that the honest response is a longer vesting schedule and more players before generation — not a more optimistic forecast.

Both are included because the alternative is worse. A settlement layer is a claim about trustworthiness, and a document that overstates the present is a poor way to begin making it.